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I. INTRODUCTION
As the current global financial crisis recedes and governments contemplate their
disengagement from the financial systems, it is useful to study whether the lessons from the
earlier Asian financial crisis, especially those with regard to risk management, played a role
in confronting the current crisis, and to examine how the Asian countries have faired since
their crisis in 1997. The global financial crisis of 2007-09, which began as a credit crisis in
the United States and spread to Europe and beyond, is considered the most serious global
economic crisis since the 1930s and has invoked unprecedented responses by various
governments and institutions around the world.1 The outbreak of the current crisis is widely
attributed to excessive leveraging and risk mismanagement by U.S. financial institutions in a
low interest-rate environment, and lax credit regulation that prevailed during the past
decades.2 Interconnections of financial institutions and financial globalization are blamed for
the rapid spread of the crisis worldwide.3
When the financial crisis started to have a real bite on the real economy, the Federal
Reserve’s initial policy response of liquidity provision was subsequently supplemented by
fiscal stimulus measures.4 Despite these measures, however, the adverse real and financial
impacts of the crisis on the United States and other developed countries have been extensive.5
In contrast, the impacts of the crisis on emerging markets (EM) have been less severe.6
Nonetheless, the ensuing global recession influences emerging markets due to a global
contraction in the demand for commodities and a global curtailment in the sources of credit
and financial flows.7

1

See generally Ingo Fender & Jacob Gyntelberg, Overview: Global Financial Crisis Spurs Unprecedented
Policy Actions, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2008, at 13-24 (discussing financial policies implemented by various
countries in response to the global market developments in 2008).
2
See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISKS, WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS, APRIL 2009
[hereinafter GFSR].
3
Id at 74.
4
See Timothy F. Geithner et al., Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Financial Stability Plan (Feb. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg21.htm (announcing measures taken to restore confidence
in the strength of U.S. financial institutions and to restart credit issuance); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Stamp Lecture at the London School of Economics: The Crisis and
the Policy Response (Jan. 13, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/pdf/20090113_Bernanke.pdf) (discussing the Federal Reserve’s policy
responses to the financial crisis).
5
See Bernanke, supra note 4.
6
See Jongmoo Jay Choi & Michael G. Papaioannou, Credit, Currency, or Derivatives: Instruments of Global
Financial Stability or Crisis?, 2009 INT’L FIN. REV. 10, at 10-16.
7
See Geithner, supra note 4; Bernanke, supra note 4.
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A distinguishing feature of the current crisis is the immediate priority placed on achieving an
adequate recovery of economies and institutions affected by the crisis, with a lesser
consideration for fiscal solvency.8 In contrast to the centralized policy implementations
utilized during the Asian financial crisis, the policy responses in the United States have been
more decentralized by involving many regulatory institutions and focusing on the rescue of
large systemic institutions.9 On the other hand, the current U.S. responses are more widereaching than the traditional monetary policy tools adopted in previous crises, and may be
necessary to provide liquidity to a greater diversity of firms and institutions, and to facilitate
broader market stability and macroeconomic recovery.10
This article compares the causes and policy responses between the current financial crisis in
the United States and other developed countries with those of the Asian financial crisis,
which originated in an emerging market. Both the U.S. and Asian crises are similar in that
their financial institutions were the initial depository of shocks due to their mismanagement
of credits and risks. As we note in Parts II and III, however, the two crises differ in their
deeper underpinnings — regulatory deficiencies underpinned the current U.S. financial crisis
while the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 could be attributed to macrofinancial
shortcomings. We also discuss the major differences in policy objectives — the U.S.
governmental policies emphasized liquidity and economic stimulus while the policies during
the Asian financial crisis were geared towards restoring international investor confidence
through tight monetary and fiscal policies. Parts IV and V discuss the implications of these
different policy perspectives and draw lessons for risk management and regulation in order to
prevent and/or better manage future financial crises.
II. CAUSES AND RESPONSES TO THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 jolted the Asian EM countries like no other economic
event since World War II. It began with an attack on the Thai Baht in July 1997 that quickly
consumed the entire country, spreading throughout Asia, and precipitating beyond.11 The
effect of the crisis was both deep and broad — countries accustomed to decades of 8-10%
positive annual real economic growth saw their growth plunge to negative 15%.12 As a
result, hundreds of firms and factories closed their shops and millions of people lost their
8

See Geithner, supra note 4; Bernanke, supra note 4.
The U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and other financial
agencies are involved in the effort to strengthen the U.S. financial system. Four main types of measures were
undertaken: (i) government guarantees on bank deposits and other bank liabilities, (ii) provisions of liquidity
support, (iii) capital injections and interventions in financial institutions, and (iv) restructuring and distress asset
resolution of financial institutions. See GFSR supra note 2; Geithner, supra note 4; Bernanke, supra note 4.
10
See Bernanke, supra note 4.
11
Jongmoo Jay Choi, The Asian Financial Crisis: Moral Hazard in More Ways Than One, 2000 INT’L FIN.
REV. 3, at 4.
12
Id. at 3.
9
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jobs.13 Stock prices, as well as currency values, plunged to half their values within days after
the crisis.14
The crisis was both unpredictable and painful, in part because the Asian government officials
failed to understand why their economies could not weather the problems, given the past
trend of continued high growth and economic success.15 The past economic success,
however, led to their over-confidence and complacency and resulted in sheer blindness to the
events unfolding across the world.16 Because they failed to account for these global events,
the Asian governments were unable to innovate and adapt to the globalization and
development occurring across the world.17
The Asian financial crisis initially started as a currency crisis—slowdowns in economic
growth reversed capital inflows, and many Asian currencies given their high current account
deficits and overvaluation came under speculative attack.18 However, the currency crisis had
deeper reasons: (i) structural problems of domestic financial and corporate systems that
depended on leverage and large inflows of external borrowings; (ii) mismanagement of
macro financial risk such as exchange rates and international reserves; and (iii) poor
corporate governance and inadequate regulations.19 A combination of inadequate domestic
financial capabilities, inadequate assessment and management of financial risk, and the
maintenance of relatively fixed exchange rates led banks and corporations to borrow large
amounts of international capital.20 Most of the borrowed capital was short-term, unhedged,
and in various foreign-currency denominations.21 Foreign capital inflows continued over
time to finance sub-par investments.22 These private sector investment and financing
decisions further fueled the crisis, after the lack of confidence by foreign investors triggered
a speculative attack and brought about massive currency devaluations.23 In addition, the
government’s mismanagement and failure to address macrofinancial and governance
issues—i.e., arbitrary government involvement in the private sector, lack of transparency in
corporate and fiscal accounting, and governmental mismanagement of the economy—
worsened the crisis.24
With the guidance from the I.M.F., the governments’ immediate responses were to tighten
their fiscal and monetary policies with the aim of restoring the confidence of international
13

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
15
Id. at 5.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See Graciela L. Kaminsky & Sergio L. Schmukler, What Triggers Market Jitters? A Chronicle of the Asian
Crisis, 18 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 537 (1999); Sheryl WuDunn & Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan, Economic Power
Aside, Seems Paralyzed by Asia Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1997, at A1.
19
See Kaminsky & Schmukler, supra note 18.
20
Id. at 6.
21
Id. at 26.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
14
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investors. In addition, they engaged in (i) corporate restructurings and reforms by inducing
improvement in corporate capital structure and corporate governance as well as structured
corporate closings and bankruptcies; (ii) consolidation of the financial service industry by
interim government takeover and subsequent sales of ailing banks and financial institutions,
coupled with liberalization of capital markets; and (iii) mitigating social impacts through
budgetary support via transfer payments and social expenditures over time.25
III. THE ASIAN ECONOMIES SINCE THE CRISIS: PERFORMANCE AND REFORMS
For the most part, the government policy measures were successful and the affected Asian
economies started growing at a fast pace shortly after the crisis was over. In fact, several
analysts consider the post-crisis recovery of the Asian economies to be the main cause of the
emergence and persistence of large current account surpluses across non-China Asia, which
are a significant counterpart to the cumulative U.S. current account deficits.26
The recovery initially took place in the form of corporate spending reduction, which set the
stage for subsequent growth.27 Some studies have attributed the post-crisis Asian current
account surpluses to the reduced corporate expenditure on fixed investment.28 The lower
corporate spending led to diminished aggregate investment rates, widened the savingsinvestment gap, and allowed the region to become a net exporter of capital.29 To some extent,
this post-crisis reduction in corporate investments reflects an ongoing restructuring
necessitated by high leverage and excess investments before the crisis.30 Given their still
conservative corporate investments and aggregate current account surpluses, it would seem
that even a decade later, the memory of the crisis still partly defines their investment
decisions in a significant way. At the same time, as the restructuring completes its course, it
is plausible that investment rates may rise again to contribute to economic growth as well as
a reduction in the region’s current account surpluses.31

25

See Jacqueline Best, The Limits of Financial Risk Management: Or, What We Didn’t Learn from the Asian
Crisis, 15 NEW POL. ECON. 29 (2010).
26
See Brahima Coulibaly & Jonathan Millar, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS, UPHILL FLOW OF CAPITAL, AND
GLOBAL IMBALANCE: EVIDENCE FROM A MICRO STUDY, (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
International Finance Discussion Paper No. 942, 2008).
27
Id. at 25.
28
Id. at 26; Steven B. Kamin, The Revised Bretton Woods System: Does it Explain Developments in Non-China
Developing Asia? (Feb. 4, 2005) (presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco conference, "The
Revived Bretton Woods System: A New Paradigm for Asian Development?") available at http://www.frbsf.org/
economics/conferences/0502/kamin.pdf.
29
Id.
30
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Lixin Xu, Corporate Performance in the East Asian Financial Crisis, 15
WORLD BANK RES. OBS. 23 (2009) (founding firm-specific weaknesses in existence before the Asian financial
crisis).
31
See Coulibaly and Millar, supra note 26.
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A.

Key Macroeconomic Parameters for Asian Countries (1995-2007)

To provide a broad perspective on changes that happened since the Asian financial crisis, in
Table 1 we present selected macroeconomic statistics for four countries primarily affected by
the Asian financial crisis (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand).
Several general points emerge. It is clear that these Asian countries could not keep with their
pre-crisis high real economic growth of 8-9%. However, by 2007, ten years after the crisis,
their growth rates have stabilized to 5-6% — still a quite respectable growth rate by a global
standard. At the same time, the Asian economies have become more solid financially. Their
current accounts have turned positive, and external debt as a percentage of GDP has
decreased dramatically. International reserves as a percent of GDP or as a percentage of
imports plus external debt have also increased significantly. This shows that the various
policies implemented by the Asian governments to address the Asian financial crisis have
been generally successful.
On a micro level, Cheung and Jang (2008) provides a score card for corporate governance
rules and regulations including disclosure, as viewed by regional experts, fund managers and
analysts for nine Asian countries.32 The results indicate a divergence between the regulatory
environment and market perceptions of corporate governance practices in these countries.
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for Asian Countries (1995-2007)33
Country

1995

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2005

2007

9.2
...
-1.7
32.8
6.3
...

4.7
...
-1.6
20.5
4.0
...

-6.9
...
11.7
52.1
15.1
...

9.5
...
5.5
74.1
16.6
...

8.5
...
2.3
96.3
18.0
...

4.0
...
1.6
102.9
20.4
...

4.0
...
1.8
210.6
24.9
...

5.1
...
0.6
262.5
25.0
...

8.4
63.4
-2.9

4.7
65.1
-2.1

-13.1
168.2
3.9

0.8
117.1
3.7

4.9
93.6
4.8

3.6
86.6
4.3

5.7
48.8
0.1

6.3
33.9
2.4

Korea
GDP growth rate (real)
External debt stock as % of GNI
Curr. Acct % of GDP
Reserves ($ billions)
Reserves % of GDP
Reserves % of (Imports + Ext. debt)
Indonesia
GDP growth rate (real)
External debt stock as % of GNI
Curr. Acct % of GDP

32

The nine countries examined in the paper are China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
33
For the raw data, see International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/ (last visited June 21, 2010); the numbers herein represent the authors’
calculations.
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Reserves ($ billions)
Reserves % of GDP
Reserves % of (Imports + Ext. debt)

14.9
6.7
8.0

17.5
7.3
8.4

23.6
22.4
11.5

27.3
17.7
13.3

29.4
17.8
13.9

28.1
17.5
14.5

34.7
12.1
14.5

56.9
13.2
21.1

9.8
40.6
-9.6
24.7
27.4
19.3

7.3
49.8
-5.8
21.5
21.1
14.6

-7.4
62.1
13.0
26.2
35.8
22.7

6.1
57.0
15.7
30.9
38.5
24.6

8.9
48.6
9.0
28.7
30.5
19.6

0.5
52.4
7.9
29.8
32.2
21.3

5.3
39.5
14.5
70.5
51.1
36.3

6.3
29.4
15.5
102.0
54.8
43.2

9.2
60.6
-8.1
36.9
22.0
19.6

-1.4
74.6
-2.0
26.9
17.8
14.2

-10.5
97.2
12.7
29.5
26.4
18.4

4.4
81.3
10.1
34.8
28.4
21.8

4.8
66.0
7.6
32.7
26.6
20.8

2.2
59.7
4.4
33.0
28.6
23.2

4.6
30.6
-4.3
52.1
29.5
26.7

4.9
26.5
6.4
87.5
35.6
36.7

Malaysia
GDP growth rate (real)
External debt stock as % of GNI
Curr. Acct % of GDP
Reserves ($ billions)
Reserves % of GDP
Reserves % of (Imports + Ext. debt)
Thailand
GDP growth rate (real)
External debt stock as % of GNI
Curr. Acct % of GDP
Reserves ($ billions)
Reserves % of GDP
Reserves % of (Imports + Ext. debt)

B. Restructuring and Reforms in One Asian Country: Korea
In order to appreciate the nature and scope of the specific changes occurred in detail, we have
focused on one country (Korea) and have traced the corporate and financial restructurings
and regulatory reforms implemented since the Asian financial crisis. The first major change
occurred in the area of corporate leverage. For example, two major Korean companies,
Samsung Electronics and Pohang Steel (POSCO), have cut down on their debt-asset ratio —
Samsung went from 74.7% in 1997 to 20.9% in 2007, and POSCO from 58.6% to 19.6%.34
The average debt-asset ratio for the ten largest corporations (as measured by market
capitalization) dropped from 73.6% in 1997 to 42.5% in 2007.35 This reduction has been
matched by an increase in average return on asset from just 1% in 1997 to 7.8% in 2007.36
The corporate and financial sectors have also undergone drastic restructuring in parallel to
changes in financial leverage. Of the ten largest business groups (chaebols) in assets as of
the end of 1997, three (Daewoo, Ssangyong, and Donga) disappeared since.37 In addition, the
Hyundai group, the largest group in 1997, has split into Hyundai Motors group and two
smaller Hyundai groups.38 As a result, there has been a drastic change in ranking of business
34

For raw data, see Korea Listed Companies Association KOCO Information, http://www.kocoinfo.com (last
visited June 21, 2010); figures presented herein reflect the authors’ calculations.
35
For raw data, see Korea Fair Trade Commission Online Provision of Enterprises Information (OPNI),
http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr (last visited June 21, 2010); figures presented herein reflect the authors’ calculations.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
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groups. Since chaebols are family-controlled business groups that control several dozens of
individual firms and dominated the Korean economy, this is a dramatic change during the
ten-year period.
The banking sector also saw heavy consolidations. As detailed in Table 2, as of the end of
1997, each of the ten largest banks (based on assets) have undergone consolidation.39 Eight
of the ten largest banks either merged or acquired other smaller banks to produce the three
largest, and presumably more competitive, banks.40 The Korean government also passed the
Financial Holding Company Act in October 2000, enabling commercial banks, securities
companies, and other financial firms to be managed under a single corporate roof.41 This was
done, in part, because combining commercial banking and other financial firms could
diversify risk and help enhance the sustainability of the financial firms.42 Interestingly, the
United States has used a similar approach in responding to the current American financial
crisis, as seen by Bank of America’s takeover of Merrill Lynch, as well as designating
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as “commercial banks”.43
The Korean government also intervened in specific financial consolidations. The cases of
two large banks—Korea First Bank and Korea Exchange Bank—vividly illustrate this point.
To save the bank from collapsing at the onset of the crisis, the Korean government through
its agency nationalized these banks with 100% ownership.44 After the dust settled and the
financial situation stabilized, the Korean government then engineered sales of the majority of
shares of these banks to foreign investors.45 Standard Chartered Bank acquired a majority
stake in Korea First Bank, and Lone Star Fund acquired a majority interest in Korea
Exchange Bank.46 Notably, in contrast to general hostility against nationalization in the
United States during the crisis, the interim government takeover of banks went quite
smoothly in Korea, perhaps because of the severity of the crisis and lack of clear alternatives.
Table 2: Consolidation of Commercial Banks After the Asian Financial Crisis47
39

See Table 2, infra.
Compiled from data from Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART) by the Korean Financial
Supervisory Service. (http://englishdart.fss.or.kr).
41
See Stephanie Strom, U.S. Firm Has Control of Korea First Bank, N.Y. Times B1 (Sep. 17, 1999).
42
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Ten Years After the Korean Crisis: Crisis, Adjustment and
Long-run Economic Growth, Conference proceeding 08-02, December 30, 2008, available at
http://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/publications/pub02_view.jsp?page=1&no=183844&sCate=013001&sSubCate=&tab
Value=1.
43
Robert Weissman, Testimony before the Hearing on "Too Big To Fail – The Role for Bankruptcy and
Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation Reform," the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Commercial
and Administrative Law, October 22, 2009.
44
For raw data, see Korean Financial Supervisory Service Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART),
http://englishdart.fss.or.kr (last visited June 21, 2010); figures presented herein reflect the authors’ calculations.
45
See supra note 44.
46
For a detailed discussion of these events, see Appendix, infra.
47
For raw data, see Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing Bankscope, https://bankscope2.bvdep.com/version2010617/Home.serv?product=scope2006 (last visited June 21, 2010); see also Korean Financial Supervisory
Services Financial Statistics Information System, http://efisis.fss.or.kr/index.html (last visited June 21, 2010).
The following changes in the Korean banking sector were observed since the Asian financial crisis: (1) Koomin
(continued)
40
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Dec. 1997

Dec. 2007
Rank
(1997)

Assets
(trill.
won)

Rank
(2007)

Assets
(trill.
won)

Korea First Bank

1

76.6

Kookmin Bank

1

218.8

Hanil Bank

2

58.3

Woori Bank

2

187.9

Kookmin Bank

3

57.0

Shinhan Bank

3

169.0

Korea Exchange Bank

4

50.2

Nonghyup

4

160.5

Korea Commercial Bank

5

50.2

Korea Industrial Bank

5

122.6

Shinhan Bank

6

44.9

Keeup Bank

6

119.3

Chohung Bank

7

40.9

Hana Bank

7

116.9

Seoul Bank

8

38.9

Korea Exchange Bank

8

79.8

Hana Bank

9

17.2

SC First Bank

9

52.9

Boram Bank

10

14.9

Citi Bank

10

46.9

Name

Name

In fact, the government has implemented a series of reforms across a spectrum of corporate
and financial sectors and markets, including corporate governance, accounting, banking,
monetary policy, foreign exchange, capital markets, bankruptcy law and financial
supervision.48 It is important to note that although these are governmental initiatives rather
than the ones by the private sector, these reforms are invariably in the direction of market
liberalization and market competition.
Some of the major regulatory reforms undertaken between October 1997 and August 2001
include:49
1. Adoption of the floating exchange rate system and the foreign exchange deregulation
that facilitate freer foreign exchange transactions and international capital flows;

Bank acquired Daedong Bank (06/98), Korea Long Term Credit Bank (12/98), Dongnam Bank (06/98) and
Jootaek Bank (11/01); (2) Shinhan Bank acquired DongHwa Bank (06/98), Jeju Bank (01/01) and Chohung
Bank (04/06). Chohung previously had acquired Chungbook Bank (04/99) and Kangwon Bank (09/99); (3)
Korea Commercial Bank and Hanil Bank merged and became Hanbit Bank (12/98), which then acquired
Pyunghwa Bank (12/01). Hanbit changed its name to Woori Bank; (4) Hana Bank acquired Chungcheong Bank
(06/98), Boram Bank (11/98) and Seoul bank (12/02); (5) Korea First Bank was sold to New Bridge Capital
(1999), which then sold it (with a profit of more than 5 trillion won) to Standard Chartered Bank in 2005, which
renamed the bank to SC First Bank; and (6) Korean Exchange Bank had been sold to Lone Star Fund in 2003.
Recently, Lone Star announced its intention to sell it within one year after legal problems had been cleared with
the Korean government. See Table 4, infra.
48
See supra note 46.
49
See supra note 46.
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2. Lifting of the limit on foreign equity ownership and related liberalization measures
that reduce the costs of foreign institutional investors in Korea;
3. Corporate government reforms, such as the requirement that firms of a certain size
should have outside independent directors on their board;
4. Accounting reforms in terms of the mandated use of external auditors and the
establishment of the standard accounting governing body and accounting rules;
5. Fair trading law that penalizes inside trading and regulation concerning the internal
transactions within a business group;
6. Capital market measures that promote corporate discipline and consolidation such as
mergers and acquisitions by domestic and foreign institutions;
7. Financial holding company law that permits integration of commercial banks and
other financial firms;
8. Corporate restructuring regulation that requires greater transparency and clarifies the
role of banks during corporate restructuring;
9. Corporate bankruptcy laws that define procedures concerning liquidation, bankruptcy,
and reorganization;
10. Interim increase in the amount of bank deposit insurance and measures that give an
authority for more independent monetary policy to Bank of Korea.
Notably, the general policy directions of many of these regulatory measures came from the
IMF.50 The Korean government was also eager to reform inadequate Korean corporate and
financial practices and infrastructure by replacing them with more modern systems and
infrastructure found in advanced countries.51 Although these reforms took place under
government initiatives, since these modern systems and infrastructure were more liberalized
than the existing systems in Korea and other emerging market countries, the end effect of
these reforms was a shift towards liberalization. The positive experience of these reforms in
Korea is consistent with academic studies on the impact of market liberalization in emerging
markets.52 One Korea-specific study also found that there is a positive impact of outside
independent director on firm performance.53 Thus, it appears that the substance of the
50

See Asian Dev. Bank, EMERGING ASIAN REGIONALISM: TEN YEARS AFTER THE CRISIS - A STUDY BY THE
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, OFFICE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, available at http://aric.adb.org/
emergingasianregionalism/.
51
See Korea Institute of International Economic Policy, supra note 42.
52
See, e.g., Peter Blair Henry, Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform and Equity Market Prices, 55 J.
FIN. 529 (2000) (stating that stock markets liberalization in emerging countries should generate a revaluation of
equity prices and a fall in the cost of equity capital).
53
See Jongmoo Jay Choi, Sae Woon Park & Sehyun Yoo, The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from
Corporate Governance Reform in Korea, 42 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 941-962 (2000) (providing evidence in
(continued)
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financial reforms is important, while the driving source of the reforms (i.e., government or
private sector) is not — a distinction that seems to have been overlooked in some of the
recent political debate in the United States.
IV. THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Causes and Implications of the American Financial Crisis
It is widely accepted that the current global financial crisis stemmed from a confluence of
several factors and events. The broad underlying causes of the crisis can be grouped into
three main categories: (1) macroeconomic or market factors; (2) risk management failures;
and (3) inadequate regulations or policies.54
Complacency brought about by a long period of expansion in credit and leverage, combined
with rapid financial innovation, is among the most often-cited macroeconomic or market
factors for the crisis.55 The crisis was preceded by more than a decade of benign economic
conditions, manifested by low interest rates, low inflation and growth volatility, and
abundant liquidity.56 Both creditors and investors shared an increased appetite for risk and
leverage during this period.57 At the same time, there was a growth of innovative and
support of the positive impact of outside directors and board independence for Korea in the aftermath of the
Asian financial crisis).
54
Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson, Eds., 2009. RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A
FAILED SYSTEM (2009); Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23
J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 77 (2009). See also FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW – A
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009); INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL
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complex structured financial products that made it easier to trade credit risk and thereby
increased the perceived liquidity of these products.58 For example, bundling mortgages into
asset-backed securities (ABS), which were then traded rather than held, created an
impression that the risk of such assets to an institution was minimal, even though it clearly
remained in the system.59 As a result, there was an unprecedented expansion of mortgages
and credit in the United States.60
Clearly, multiple risk management failures that left the financial system vulnerable to
excessive risk-taking contributed to the financial crisis. It is evident that market discipline—
which operates as a check against excesses—had failed. Compensation practices and
incentives for executives and traders as well as bankers, underwriters, and rating agencies,
encouraged the weakening of underwriting and credit standards in favor of promoting
volume growth.61 Inadequate methodologies and incentives for fee revenues may have
compromised credit rating agencies’ due diligence, while institutional investors’ search for
yield resulted in excessive reliance on the credit rating agencies.62 Finally, banks may have
underestimated the liquidity risk in their funding models, due to the misperception of
counterparty risk of complicated derivative instruments such as credit default swaps, and the
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misunderstanding of extreme “black swan” events.63 In some instances, banks established
off-balance sheet entities to facilitate rapid growth and generate fee income.64 This implied
poor disclosure of material corporate risk, which further weakened the efficacy of corporate
risk management.
Policy institutional frameworks have also proven inadequate in preventing the crisis.
Regulatory and prudential norms necessary for supervisory oversight significantly lagged
behind financial innovation.65 In addition, financial supervisors lacked a macro-prudential
perspective, failed to monitor off-balance sheet entities and liquidity buffers, relied too
heavily on ratings for capital charges, and failed to take countervailing actions.66 In addition,
central bank liquidity frameworks were not flexible enough to cope with unexpected liquidity
shocks. In some cases, crisis management and deposit insurance schemes proved to be
outdated, and various regulatory agencies were compartmentalized without sufficient regard
to the interdependencies of financial institutions and markets.67 Further, valuation,
disclosure, and accounting inadequacies seem to have exacerbated the situation. For
example, deficiencies concerning disclosure requirements in accounting methods and gaps
associated with the valuation and financial reporting of structured products may have been a
key contributing factor.68
There have been estimates that between the start of the crisis and June 2009, the global
financial system has suffered worldwide writedowns and credit losses of over $1.5 trillion.69
These losses are concentrated in the Americas (approximately $1 trillion) and Europe (over
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$450 billion), while Asia has been minimally affected (around $50 billion).70 As a result of
these stringent conditions, banks in advanced countries increased deleveraging and tightened
lending standards, while simultaneously lowering cross-border exposure.71These
developments indicate that Asia has been the least affected by the US crisis, possibly as a
result of policy reforms implemented in response to the Asian financial crisis as well as the
Chinese growth and stimulus measures implemented to counter the current global recession.72
B. Policy Responses to the U.S. Financial Crisis
The initial policy response to the crisis was swift and substantial, reflecting government
concern on weaknesses in the banking sector that could quickly lead to a widespread crisis.
Policy interventions focused first on providing liquidity in the financial sector. However, as
the crisis intensified in the Fall of 2008, governmental responses were aimed at maintaining
financial sector stability and, in many emerging markets, at avoiding disorderly exchange
rate depreciations.73 In some countries, vulnerabilities that had accumulated prior to the
crisis constrained any possible responses.74 This was more pronounced in cases of substantial
foreign-currency borrowing and unsustainably high rates of credit growth.75
Public intervention measures to support the financial system involved various institutions,
including the government, government agencies and the central bank, and employed different
schemes and operations. Globally, the most common schemes were: (i) deposit insurance
measures, with governments often injecting funds to deposit insurance agencies; (ii) bank
debt guarantees, with governments aiming to ensure the smooth functioning of wholesale
borrowing and credit markets; (iii) central bank measures to ease liquidity, with central banks
establishing new uncollateralized lending facilities, providing loans using non-traded
collaterals, and rolling over lending via daily repos, as well as other government liquidity
support, such as government placements of deposits to banks; (iv) recapitalizations, with
governments injecting capital in troubled banks and mortgage agencies in exchange for
preferred or common shares; (v) purchases of assets, with governments buying mortgages
and other “toxic” assets from banks using different types of financing; (vi) bank loans, with
central banks and government agencies providing collateralized lending, subordinated loans
and other forms of capital to banks. Table 3 indicates such response measures for selected
developed and emerging market countries.
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Table 3: Financial System Public Intervention Measures (2008-2009)76
Deposit Insurance

Establish, increase or
expand

France
Germany

X

Italy

Debt
Guarantee
Wholesale
borrowing

Liquidity
Provision
New
measures
introduced

X

X

X

X

X

South Korea
United
Kingdom

Capital plans
established

X

Japan
Spain

Recapitalization
Schemes

X

X

X

X

X

Asset Management

Asset
purchase
plans

Loan
guarantees

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

United States
Brazil
X

X

China
X
India
X
Russia
X

X

X

X

X

X

In general, when banking systems were under added pressure from deposit outflows and
possible bank failures, policy responses primarily focused on maintaining stability. To
bolster confidence in the banking system, governments raised the deposit-insurance limit and
expanded the scope of domestic deposit insurance schemes to resolve problem banks.77 As
the crisis unfolded, some governments also auctioned excess budgetary funds to banks to
maintain liquidity.78 Gradually, these auctions were scaled back and replaced by an everwidening array of central bank facilities including quantitative easing.79 In addition, central
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banks offered guarantees for inter-bank lending to qualifying banks, covering losses in the
event that the counterparty fails.80
Given the magnitude of the problems, the US government instituted a variety of monetary
and financial measures. The Fed undertook substantial liquidity injections as the economic
downturn was testing the resilience of the banking systems.81 The Treasury along with the
Fed also introduced significant regulatory forbearance by easing loan classification and
provisioning requirements, and also took steps to loosen accounting standards to limit banks’
mark-to-market losses and expand access to their unsecured loan auctions.82 In most cases,
the combination of central bank liquidity provision and regulatory forbearance allowed the
banking system to overcome the strains from the crisis relatively well, although some banks
had to be taken into receivership by the FDIC or directly capitalized by the Treasury.83
As financial sector problems spread to the real economy, fiscal stimulus packages were
instituted by the Administration and Congress to support domestic demand. The packages
included tax cut, as well as additional spending to support such strategic sectors as clean
energy, health care and education in addition to infrastructure and unemployment
assistance.84 As the first signs of economic recovery and financial stabilization have been
observed, indicating that the monetary and fiscal public intervention measures undertaken
have been effective, the challenge to policymakers now is how and when these injected funds
can be reversed to reduce the skyrocketing public debt and to fight the looming inflationary
pressures.85 Already, the United States, along with other countries, has started to gradually
retire some of the introduced measures that aimed to provide guarantees and enhance
liquidity in the banking system.86
V. COMMONALITIES BETWEEN THE ASIAN AND U.S. CRISES AND RISK MANAGEMENT
A. Fundamental Causes of the Asian and U.S. Financial Crises
Many researchers have argued that financial crises share many common causes related to
fundamental factors.87 In particular, those economic and/or financial factors that indicate
economic distress and adversely affect investors’ sentiment should be considered as the root
80
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causes of financial crises. Among these factors are a widening current account deficit, a
deterioration of fiscal deficit, a significant economic slowdown or recession, the bursting of
stock and/or real estate price bubbles, and increases in the level of short-term foreign debt.88
However, the exact timing of the crisis is difficult to determine on the basis of
fundamentals.89 Further, most contenders of the fundamental approach agree that extended
credit is at the core of crises, although its source may vary, with Krugman focusing on the
monetization of government deficits and McKinnon and Pill pointing out to the role of
foreign capital inflows channeled through domestic banks, deposit insurance, moral hazard,
and overlending.90
The U.S. financial crisis of 2007-09—although different from the Asian financial crisis of
1997-1998 in terms of scale, impact and the role played by financial innovation—has
exhibited many common causes: prevailing macroeconomic imbalances, large and persistent
capital flows, excessive leverage, the growth of sub-par investments and asset price bubbles,
including a property bubble.91 Several observers note that the principal underlying
shortcoming of most of these factors is a failure of risk assessment, which had also been
identified as a determining factor for the Asian crisis.92 However, given the inherent
inadequacy and political difficulty of arriving at institutional and regulatory solutions in
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preventing the crisis, the question is whether crises of this type are inevitable, irrespective of
how well we can prepare ex ante.93
While US credit growth, especially mortgage loans, increased dramatically between 2002
and mid-2007, US real estate prices rose by almost 50 percent during this period.94 These
signs were also present in East Asia before the 1997 crisis.95 However, what helped fuel the
US loan expansion was the low interest rate environment and ease of mortgage securitization
that prevailed in the decade before the US crisis, while in the Asian crisis, it was large capital
inflows stemming primarily from private sector borrowing.96 Nonetheless, it is clear that lax
underwriting standards and improper risk management were present in both the US and
Asian crises.97
As the US financial crisis quickly became a global financial crisis, it became evident that the
same macroeconomic and microeconomic factors were also to be blamed in the countries
most affected. At the macroeconomic level, the main contributing factors were the
persistence of large global current account imbalances and the sustained period of low real
interest rates, which generated credit booms in a number of countries and an increasingly
intense “search for yield.”98 At the microeconomic level, the contributing factors were
failures in risk management and corporate governance arrangements, distorted incentives,
inadequate investor due diligence, and weaknesses in regulatory frameworks, in particular
porous regulatory borders.99
B. What Triggered the Crises
Under conditions of economic and/or financial distress, what triggers a financial crisis is an
event – such as the announcement of disappointing unemployment figures or dramatic
decreases in corporate profits and financial problems of a prominent bank – that completely
undermine the confidence in the system and makes investors think of the dangers of a
financial collapse.100 The announcement of the insolvency of the Lehman Brothers in the
case of the US crisis and that of a persistent decline in company earnings in the case of the
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Asian crisis unnerved financial markets and became the triggering factors for both of these
financial crises.101
C. Policy Responses
In response to the Asian crisis, many important policy reform initiatives were undertaken,
aiming at strengthening the robust risk management discipline of the domestic financial
systems.102 The emphasis of these reforms was mainly on instilling prudent regulations, riskbased supervision and strong risk management.103 In particular, these reforms aimed at
curtailing excessive leverage and household indebtedness, so as to help maintain domestic
financial stability.104 In the case of the US and ensuing global crisis, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision agreed in early September 2009 on a comprehensive set of measures to
strengthen micro-prudential regulation, supervision and management of risks arising from
systemic, interconnected banks.105 Moreover, it intended to further look to strengthen the
regulatory capital framework, to enhance loan loss provisioning rules, to establish a global
liquidity standard, to develop a systemic risk capital charge, and to minimize the conflict
between accounting standards and prudential supervision, and to address cross-border
resolutions of financial institutions.106
D. Implications for Risk Management
It has been widely argued that international creditor banks operating in the Asian markets had
assumed that their exposure to private borrowers would be protected by an implicit local
government guarantee.107 This assumption may have induced them to take on larger
exposures than warranted by normal credit standards. The Asian financial crisis proved that
such expectation was unrealistic as the government guarantee turned out no avail, without the
assistance from the IMF and the international community. This confirmed the moral hazard
problem, as the risky loans from international banks were paid up from the IMF-assisted
funds.108
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Another important lesson is the recognition of the extent of “the interrelationship between
different types of risk across markets and countries in times of crisis as well as the speed and
extent of contagion.”109
From the standpoint of a lending bank, the Asian crisis also proved the importance of country
risk. The traditional concept of sovereign and transfer risk must be extended to include
systemic risks posed by private sector counterparties. Since the Asian financial crisis,
several measures were undertaken to improve risk management capabilities of individual
banks. In particular, the Basle Committee overhauled the weighting schemes of internal and
external ratings for determining country risk.110 In addition, it placed a greater emphasis on
banks’ internal risk assessment practices as well as counterparty risk exposures, while
supervisory practices moved toward a more risk-based approach for measuring and managing
risk.111 However, the improvements since the Asian crisis did not prove adequate to avert
banks’ supervisory and regulatory breakdowns as evidenced in the U.S. crisis.
Meanwhile, the measurement of risk interconnections during crisis periods, and the speed
with which emerging market can become illiquid, pointed to the importance of using stress
testing and scenario analysis in addition to traditional risk management methods.112 Further,
the role of rating agencies should be examined carefully because in both the Asian and U.S.
crises, there were little changes in their ratings of sovereign and corporate borrowers before
the crisis, but there were very swift and large rating downgrades after the crisis broke, which
actually exacerbated the crisis.
E. Derivatives Regulation
From the U.S. crisis, it is clear that the extent of bank risk is also related to the evolution of
the financial systems and products overall, which has important implications for risk
governance and regulation.113 First and foremost, as risk can materialize very rapidly and
substantially, banking institutions should maintain adequate capital levels at all times. This
became evident as only a short time before July 2007, the spreads on bank credit default
swaps – a key forward indicator of the perceived riskiness of banks – had reached record
lows.114
The nature and scope of the credit risks that emerged in the global financial system from
complex, structured sub-prime instruments, and their interconnections with market risks were
not adequately understood. Instead, it was widely believed that the development of
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securitization markets would distribute credit risks to a diversified group of investors and
thereby making banks safer and counterparty risk for individual investors minimal.115
However, when the crisis broke, the majority of securitized credit risks were held by major
international banks and by unregulated, highly-leveraged near-banks, which lack adequate
understanding of the risks involved and possible value losses from adverse unexpected
market developments.116 Given the difficulty in understanding and valuing these derivative
transactions and their impacts on systemic risk, there may be a call for regulating derivativesrelated trading.
F. Compensation and Board Governance
In addition to inadequate financial regulation and excessive reliance on uninformative credit
ratings, the U.S. crisis also suggests that misaligned risk incentives for mortgage
underwriters and structured-instrument sellers were among the core problems that led to the
crisis. Since bonus or market-based compensations may lead to excessive risk-taking by
financial institutions, several lessons could be learned in this regard. First, managerial
compensation (including traders’) should be aligned with the objective of ensuring long-term
sustainability of the institution as well as limiting its contribution to systemic risk.
Specifically, variable remunerations such as bonuses, stock options or commissions should
be symmetric with changes in either direction depending on long-term performance and
should also be kept within some pre-determined range. Clawback provision and vest period
limitation may also be needed to constrain personal exploitations of asymmetric corporate
risk-taking as well as profiting from short-run market gyrations.
In principle, the board is responsible for developing the executive compensation policies.
However, given the fact that many board directors are selected de facto by the CEO, it is
doubtful that they would have either independence or expertise to go against the CEO and to
take account of the interests of shareholders or the aggregate economy. Provisions that
executive compensations should be voted upon in the shareholders meeting may help.
However, the recent experience of banking firms boosting bonuses even in the face of
declining profits or government bailouts suggests that these accountability measures at the
individual financial institution level should be incorporated into a country’s prudential
macrofinancial framework for governance.117
Good governance is important in developing sound risk management, as boards take a major
role in defining and determining the risk profile of financial institutions. In the U.S. financial
crisis, it is clear that boards of a number of major financial institutions failed to carry out that
role.118 As potential antidotes, the board needs to formulate a sound risk management
strategy, including a decision on the extent of a firm’s involvement in complex financial
instruments as well as designing appropriate risk management strategies. In doing that, the
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board needs to integrate risk management with the overall corporate growth strategy.119 In
addition, the board should oversee regular stress testing to determine the firm’s liquidity and
capital needs.
VI. THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS IN LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Even though the current global financial crisis is still evolving, several preliminary lessons
may be drawn at this juncture. The first lesson is that financial crises can originate in
developed economies as in emerging markets. The current US financial crisis is largely
facilitated by an expansion of domestic credit and financial innovation.120 In contrast, the
Asian financial crisis was deepened by shallow domestic financial markets, which had
pushed the Asian firms and banks to seek external financing.121 Both the U.S. in 2007 and
emerging Asia in 1997 had significant current account deficits and a declining international
competitiveness, but these only turned out critical for Asia that maintained fixed exchange
rates and not so for the U.S. given the seigniorage of the US dollar as an international reserve
currency and solid credit reputation of U.S. government despite large external debt
accumulations. However, in both contexts, the excessive leverage-financed expansions were
the fundamental reason that led to the financial crisis.122
A second lesson is that the deficient and fragmented regulatory and supervisory systems in
the U.S. contributed to the excessive leverage that fueled the current U.S. crisis. The
Securities and Exchange Commission approved the debt-to-equity ratio of major investment
banks to go up from approximately 10:1 to 40:1 in 1994, and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act removed the Chinese wall between commercial and investment banks and insurance
companies in 1999 while the supervisory authorities were still fragmented along the old
industry lines.123 This contrasts with the Asian financial crisis (and other emerging market
crises) where the primary reason was the lack of trust by international investors in the
sustainability of the countries’ macrofinancial policies.124
A third lesson is that the seriousness of a crisis in terms of its adverse impacts may
necessitate unconventional as well as conventional monetary and fiscal policy measures to
effectively deal with the crisis. It is interesting that while the initial symptoms (collapse of
financial institutions) and fundamental reasons (excessive leverage) are the same, the
macroeconomic policies undertaken in the U.S. now and Asia then are diametrically opposed
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to each other.125 The U.S. government is engaging in monetary policy easing and
expansionary fiscal policies, while the Asian governments during their crisis were forced to
undertake tight monetary and fiscal policies imposed by the IMF.126 The implication is that
two opposite policy measures, if well designed and executed, could work to cope with
financial crises in different institutional and market settings.
As we are going forward, the current crisis revealed various regulatory shortcomings both at
the national and global level, as well as several inadequacies regarding the financial crisis
management and resolution framework, that need to be addressed. Among these issues are
the design of international financial support mechanisms for systemically important financial
institutions and financial systems with an objective of establishing a clear process for
coordinating management and resolution authorities regarding global financial risk, and the
adoption of international accounting standards for financial institutions at times of serious
financial distress that minimize arbitrary and non-transparent assessments of troubled assets
and institutions.127
Further, no other crisis than the current U.S. financial crisis has elicited such an extensive
battery of public intervention measures globally since the Great Depression. From the outset,
it became evident that the taming the crisis would require a political will at the country level
for a swift design and effective implementation of comprehensive response strategies.
Critical in the development of this strategy is a balance between a swift implementation of
such strategies and the control of moral hazard problems arising from the shift of risks from
shareholders and creditors of specific financial institutions to the sovereign governments or
international institutions. Whether this balance was upheld in policy measures taken during
the current U.S. financial issue, as well as during the Asian financial crisis, is an open issue.
In retrospect, the Asian financial crisis highlighted the importance of: (1) a sound
macroeconomic policy framework, and the dangers of unsustainable large current account
deficits; (2) fuller disclosure of all relevant and reliable economic and financial data on a
timely basis; (3) financial sector reform, including better regulation and supervision; and (4)
promotion of good governance, with enhancement of the accountability and transparency of
fiscal accounts as its key feature.128 These lessons from the Asian crisis have certainly
helped shape the policies undertaken during the current U.S. financial crisis. However, the
failings that led to the U.S. crisis raise the question of whether the factors that led to the
Asian crisis were well-understood and properly addressed globally, and whether they pose a
new challenge for drawing new lessons from the U.S. financial crisis.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In comparing and contrasting the Asian and U.S. financial crises, we can summarize the main
similarities and differences with respect to their causes, responses and implications as
follows:
(1) Both crises are partially caused by excessive leverage. However, the Asian crisis has
more basic real sector reasons, while the U.S. crisis originated in the mortgage and financial
sector;
(2) Part of the reasons for the Asian financial crisis was the underdevelopment of domestic
financial market infrastructure, while the U.S. crisis is partly due to the overdeveloped
financial innovations. However, in both cases, the failure of risk management aggregated the
problems;
(3) Government policies after the crisis were almost the opposite of each other – tight
monetary and fiscal policies in Asia and easy monetary and fiscal policies in the U.S.
However, both might make sense given the different economic situations, i.e., uncertainty
about the sovereign risk for the Asian government, but not so for the U.S., and greater and
global implications of the U.S. crisis;
(4) Both crises have moral hazard problems, albeit in a different context. However, excess
compensation and incentive misalignment appears to be the major problem for the U.S., but
not in Asia;
(5) Asia fared better in the current global financial crisis partly because of the major reforms
undertaken since the Asian financial crisis; and
(6) Many of the reforms undertaken in Asia in the aftermath of its crisis, as well as policy
responses, have implications for the current debate for the regulatory reform in the U.S.
In the Asian financial crisis, the redesigning and reforming economic and financial systems
to effectively address large capital flows and to manage the associated risks proved to be
major challenges for regulators and policymakers. In response to the strong capital inflows
and liquidity, banks had overextended in leverage and lending, which gave rise to asset price
bubbles and overvalued currencies. In the current U.S. crisis, the Fed’s low interest rate
policy as well as capital inflows from abroad also created an abundance of liquidity and led
banks to be lax in their lending policies, resulting in the real-estate boom and sub-prime
mortgage crisis. Going forward, to prevent such bubbles and consequent crises, it is
imperative that the risk management of financial institutions continue to be strengthened and
regulators be prepared to use macro-prudential measures proactively to reduce systemic risk.
This implies that credit standards and bank capital rules remain vigilant regardless of market
conditions.
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APPENDIX
Corporate and Financial Reforms in Korea in the aftermath of the Asian Financial
Crisis
Announcement
Date

Contents

Area

10/28/1997

Foreign exchange regulation has been relaxed to facilitate foreign fund
inflows.

Foreign
exchange

11/25/1997

This law gives the Bank of Korea more independency over monetary
policy decision and execution.

Monetary
policy

11/25/1997

The government agency provides deposit insurance for the full amount of
bank deposits, effective for deposits for the period from 11/19/1997 to
12/31/2000.

Deposit
Insurance

12/10/1997

Stock market was opened to foreign investors more broadly. The total
foreign ownership of a listed firm increased to 50%, and the limit for an
individual foreigner investor increased to 7%.

Capital
markets

12/16/1997

The floating exchange rate was adopted.

Foreign
exchange

1/18/1998

Corporations with assets of more than 7 billion won are mandated to hire
external auditors registered with the government.

Auditing

2/1/1998

Listed corporations must have at least one outside independent director or
at least one-fourth of the number of directors in the board must be outside
independent directors.

Corporate
governance

2/1/1998

Regulation limiting internal investments within the business groups was
suspended during the period of February 1998 to March 2001.

Fair
Trading

2/15/1998

Regulations on mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors are eased.

Capital
markets

2/24/1998

As per the recommendation of the World Bank, three laws pertaining to
corporate bankruptcy was enacted: liquidation, bankruptcy, and
reorganization. This law has been amended once in 1999.
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Corporate
bankruptcy

3/1/1998

Foreign investors are permitted to create funds to purchase bond or stocks
for arbitrage purposes, with special tax benefits. This is designed to
provide liquidity to troubled Korean firms.

Capital
markets

5/16/1998

Limits on foreign investor in stock trading were abolished.

Capital
markets

6/1/1998

Government announced a two-step Foreign Exchange Liberalization plan.
The first step is to simplify foreign exchange transactions, and the second
is to remove most regulations on foreign exchange transactions.

Foreign
exchange

1/2/1999

The Financial Supervisory Service was established by consolidating four
existing supervisory bodies (Banking Supervisory Authority, Securities
Supervisory Board, Insurance Supervisory Board, and Non-bank
Supervisory Authority) into a single supervisory body. It is subject to
oversight by the Financial Services Commission, and shares some
responsibility with the Securities and Futures Commission.

Financial
Supervision

2/1/1999

Foreign investors can establish vulture funds to buy troubled firms for
restructuring and subsequent sale for profit.

Capital
markets

4/1/1999

The first step of the Foreign Exchange Liberalization Plan regarding the
simplification of foreign exchange transactions becomes effective.

Foreign
exchange

1/1/2000

This amendment mandates that publicly traded large firms (asset more
than 200 billion won) have at least one outside independent directors or
that number of outside independent directors be more than half of the
number of directors in the board.

Corporate
governance

7/27/2000

The Korean Accounting Standard Board was established to create
accounting standards for Korean firms.

Accounting

10/1/2000

Securities of trouble companies can be pooled to facilitate sales.

10/13/2000

Financial holding companies are allowed to own more than one financial
institution. By this law, existing financial institutions can become
financial holding companies.

Financial
Holding
Company

1/1/2001

The second step of the Foreign Exchange Liberalization Plan regarding
further relaxation of foreign exchange transactions becomes effective.

Foreign
exchange

8/14/2001

Corporate restructuring law (effective from 8/14/2001 to 12/31/2010) is
enacted to provide greater transparency of firms, to enable financial
institutions to better monitor borrowing firms, and to restructure troubled
firms with market mechanisms. This law defines the role of financial

Corporate
Restructuring
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Corporate
Restructuring

institutions during the corporate restructuring process and revises
procedures concerning corporate restructuring.

Unless noted otherwise, the announcement date is also the effective date.
Sources:
Young Han Kim, IMF and Korean Economy, Seohaemoonjip 1998 (in Korean)
Samsung Economic Research Institute, IMF and Korean Economy, Dec. 9 1997 (in Korean)
Kim In Joon and Lee Chang Young, Ten Years After the Crisis - Changes and Challenges in the Korean Financial Market, Seoul National
University Press 2008. (in Korean)
Corporate Restructuring Law, Korea Fair Trading Commission.
Kim, Sang Min and Young Jin Kim, Summary of Main Regulations on Financial Restructuring, Maeil Business News, November 2, 1997.
(in Korean)
Kim, Sang Min and Young Jin Kim, Summary of Main Regulations on Financial Restructuring (2), Maeil Business News, November 14,
1997. (in Korean)
Kim Min Bae, IMF Crisis Related Regulations in the Congress, Chosun Ilbo, February 2, 1998.
Data compiled from National Archives of Korea, http://www.archives.go.kr/english/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
Data compiled from National Law Information Center, http://www.law.go.kr/LSW/Main.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
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